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Series B

5 October 1970

MEMORANDUM FOR THE RECORD

SUBJECT: Briefing of [ ] OMB, on Middle  
East Coverage on 2 October 1970, 0930-1100

ATTENDEES:

[ ]

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1. The display and briefing illustrated coverage of the Suez Canal area during August and September, 1970. The case history of each SAM site constructed or occupied during the cease fire was presented. Other exhibits illustrated the quality of the coverage provided by the [ ] cameras in the U-2 missions, and satellite coverage, [ ] Examples were shown of the use of dummy sites and equipment, attempts to vary the "signature" of the sites, and the deployment of SA-3 equipment at SA-2 sites (which would confuse an attacker about the system to expect unless the switch of systems had been detected). The use of equipment of one system at sites for another definitely raised the requirement for good quality, high resolution imagery.

2. Several important substantive points were raised. First, the lack of a base-line fix at the outset of the cease fire made it difficult to establish the fact of the first violation. (State had not given sufficient consideration to the need of monitoring the agreement and the lead time required if this were to be done.) Secondly, the language of the agreement was ambiguous so that there was no clear cut distinction as to what constituted admissible "maintenance" and movement of equipment already in the area and what constituted a violation. Third, the U-2 flights are not using the best available cameras (risk of plane crashing, possible release of photography to public and/or other countries). Finally, it is clear that the Soviets

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and Egyptians have accomplished a major objective -- the moving of a formidable SAM screen of SA-2 and SA-3 sites to close proximity to the canal. The number of operational SA-3 sites has increased from five just before the cease fire to a probable 27 by the end of September. The number of SA-2 sites is now well over 100. The violation is now so massive that it does not require documentation on a case-by-case basis any more.

3. It was clear that the OMB views the matter as a small-scale version of an arms control monitoring problem and a valuable lesson in the role of reconnaissance systems. The questions asked concerned the substantive problem, the resolutions necessary and used, the roles of search and spotting reconnaissance, the need for stereo coverage, and target density. All of these topics are relevant to the potential use of a near-real-time satellite in a similar case.

4. The mode of presentation used -- which consisted of dozens of briefing boards exhibited in a large room -- was distracting because too much information was within view at one time and there was a tendency for the audience to break up into small groups discussing quite diverse topics with the NPIC briefers. [redacted] appeared to take a very casual attitude throughout.

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[redacted]  
Production Team

SEY:lw

Distribution:

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" 2 [redacted]

" 3 - Prod. Team

X1

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